A Taxonomy of Disgust in Art by Carroll, Noël & Contesi, Filippo
A Taxonomy of Disgust in Art 
 
 
Noël Carroll and Filippo Contesi 
 
 
 
This is a pre-print. 
Please refer to the published version (Art, Excess, and Education, 
Palgrave Macmillan): 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21828-7_2 
1 
 
A Taxonomy of Disgust in Art 
Noël Carroll and Filippo Contesi 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 The association of art and disgust has been perennial. Populated by the likes of Polyphemus, 
Medusa and The Minotaur, classical legend is full of disgusting beings, while the Dark Ages served up 
Grendel, and into the contemporary period, we have creatures like Stephen King’s Pennywise and Clive 
Barker’s Rawhead Rex to round out our western, literary bestiary of abominable creatures.  
From fine art, we are entranced by portrayals of the last judgment, such as Michelangelo’s, by 
visions of Hell, like those of Bosch, and by installations exemplifying death and deterioration of the sort 
produced by Damien Hirst for the exhibition Sensations, or the huge pile-shaped fecal sculptures of the 
Viennese art collective Gelatin (as presented at the Museum Boijmans van Beuningen in Rotterdam). 
From the East, we find similar preoccupations with images of disgust – both literary and pictorial – 
as in the skeletal images of Durga/Kali bent upon murderous rampages, her necklace decorated with a 
string of bleeding, decapitated heads.   
Popular culture has whole genres whose predominant objects are disgusting, such as splatter-punk 
(e.g., Family Tradition, a novel by Edward Lee and John Phelan) and torture porn (such as movie series like 
Saw and The Human Centipede). Likewise, the currently ubiquitous, zombie apocalypses represented by 
televisual programs like The Walking Dead (based on the comic book series by Robert Kirkman and Tony 
Moore), which rule the airways. 
 This taste, so to speak, for disgust, has been evident outside the precincts of art and representation 
for at least four centuries as people have flocked to the fairgrounds to experience the thrill of witnessing so-
called “freaks” – sometimes literally natural anomalies, like Siamese Twins, two-headed births, including 
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human fetuses – and sometimes counterfeits, such as P.T. Barnum’s “mermaids.” Similarly, Ripley (“Believe 
It or Not”) Entertainment Inc. operates ninety attractions (a.k.a. ”museums”) around the world and has 
drawn over 100 million customers since 1933, hoping to see the collections of “weird” phenomena often of 
the kind found in circus side-shows. This suggests that the fascination with the disgusting in art rests upon 
and evolved from an appetite deep in the human psyche. That is, Tod Browning’s film Freaks, for instance, 
satisfies the same generic curiosity and craving for biological anomalies (and the accompanying experiences 
of disgust) afforded by “freak shows.” 
 And yet, despite the vast evidence for the existence of disgust as a significant theme of art, there is a 
possible traditional argument that denies that disgust is a legitimate subject of genuine art. This argument 
rests upon an enduring association between art and the beautiful.  In the eighteenth century, art was often 
identified with the imitation of the beautiful in nature.1 Beauty, in turn, was associated with pleasure, 
notably disinterested pleasure. Putting these two ideas together, it is suggestive to arrive at the view that 
artworks have as their function the affordance of disinterested pleasure. Call this an early version of the 
aesthetic theory of art. 
 However, at the same time, the sensation of disgust was regarded as inimical to pleasure.  Genuine 
fine art portrayed what we might ordinarily find disgusting – say dead bodies – beautifully. But if the 
disgusting object were portrayed as such, that, it was believed, would preclude pleasure, and, thus, 
arguably art status. Or, at least, that is how the argument might go. 
 Perhaps the most authoritative source for the major premise – that disgust precludes pleasure – for 
an argument like this is Kant’s Critique of Judgment. In section 48, referring explicitly to disgust, Kant writes:  
For in that strange sensation, which rests on nothing but imagination, the object is presented as if it 
insisted, as it were, on our enjoying it even though that is what we are forcefully resisting; and 
                                                     
1 See Charles Batteux, The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle, translated by James O. Young (Oxford University 
Press, 2015). Originally published in 1746. 
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hence the artistic presentation of the object is no longer distinguished in our sensation from the 
nature of this object itself, so that it cannot possibly be considered beautiful.2 
Consequently, if one holds something like the aforesaid early version of the aesthetic theory of art, 
whatever putative artistic stimulus elicits disgust is not genuine art, properly so-called. 
 The problem with this argument, of course, is the narrowness of its conception of the aim of art. 
Art does not only aim at the beautiful, especially as that is conceived of in terms of the affordance of 
disinterested pleasure. Art has a diversity of functions, many of which are at odds with the contemplation of 
the beautiful, such as arousing hatred toward a despised enemy. Among those alternative ends are the 
elicitation of curiosity with the promise of rewarding it with fascination. 
 The objects of disgust are often abnormal in one sense or another – often impure or incomplete or 
unclean, excessive, categorically contradictory relative to a dominant cultural scheme, forbidden, freakish, 
particularly biologically. They are things to be hidden, shunned or avoided. They are not, or should not be, 
out in the open. For these reasons, they are the natural objects of the epistemic emotion of curiosity. But 
with such curiosity comes the risk of disgust. 
 Disgust is nature’s defense (often re-purposed by culture) against our exposure to insalubrity. We 
gag or recoil in the presence of its objects. Thus, when we approach the “freak-show” tent, we pay for our 
                                                     
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), p. 180.  
In this, Kant is reiterating the view that he had put forward in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
the Sublime, where he stated that “Nothing is so opposed to the beautiful as the disgusting…” See Kant, 
Anthropology, History, Education, translated by Paul Guyer, edited by Louden and Zoeller (Cambridge University 
Press), p. 44. Kant was not alone in holding the view that disgust is strongly antithetical to aesthetic pleasure, nor 
was he the first to express it. Moses Mendelssohn, in his “82nd Letter Concerning Literature” (1760), said that “The 
sensations of disgust thus are always nature, never imitation,” and that in disgust “the soul does not recognize any 
obvious admixture of pleasure.” See Winfried Menninghaus, Disgust. Theory and History of a Strong Sensation 
(State University of New York Press, 2003). Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1766) quoted Mendelssohn approvingly on 
this topic. See Lessing, Laocoön: An essay on the limits of painting and poetry, translated by E.A. McCormick 
(Bobbs-Merrill, 1766/1962). Even (almost) a century later, Arthur Schopenhauer rehashed the same view when he 
said that the disgusting had “always been recognised as absolutely inadmissible in art, where even the ugly can be 
tolerated in its proper place so long as it is not disgusting.” See Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 
Representation, vol. I, translated by E.F.J. Payne (Dover Publications, 1859/1969), p. 208.  
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curiosity with pain. Yet that does not cancel the possibility of pleasure altogether. For, we may be rewarded 
with the experience of novelty, of something beyond ordinary and/or approved experience, something 
beyond our ken or even forbidden where the thrill of discovery outweighs the pang of revulsion. 
 Perhaps because this pleasure is mixed with the satisfaction of what is in part a cognitive interest 
(and, hence, not disinterested), this experience will be dismissed as aesthetically illegitimate. But surely 
cashiering our cognitive concerns from the domain of the artistic interests is as historically blinkered as 
discounting feelings of disgust as a source of art’s provenance. Try imagining the history of Christian art 
without any gruesome crucifixions. 
 In this essay, we mean to use the notion of disgust as it figures in ordinary language and experience. 
Proceeding in this way, we will propose a taxonomy of disgust-in-art in terms of three categories. These 
categories are defined using two variables: the subject (or content) of the artwork (what it is about) and its 
vehicle (how that subject is embodied or articulated).  Each of these variables, in turn, can be either 
disgusting or not. 
 For example, an artwork may be about something that is not disgusting in itself – say, a rival 
religion – but which is represented in a disgusting way – its priests portrayed as slavering cannibals, 
drooling blood and pieces of human flesh from their serrated maws. 
 Given this grid, we develop three categories: artworks whose subjects are disgusting and whose 
vehicles are disgusting; artworks whose subjects are not disgusting but whose vehicles are; and artworks 
whose subjects are disgusting but whose vehicles are not. We ignore the category of artworks where neither 
the subject nor the vehicle are disgusting for the obvious reason that these artworks are not disgusting in any 
way.   
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 We admit that taxonomies other than ours may be useful.3 Nevertheless, we feel that this 
classificatory scheme brings certain interesting phenomena to light. 
 
2. Disgusting Subjects and Disgusting Vehicles 
 
The first category contains artworks which aim to provide a treatment of a disgusting subject 
matter by means of a disgusting vehicle. One large class of cases that provide good candidate members for 
this category is constituted by works of literature, film etc. in the horror genre. Many horror fictions aim to 
represent a gory and violent subject matter in realistic ways, by disgusting means. Consider for instance 
Ridley Scott’s Hannibal (2001), one of the films that follow the adventures of the fictional serial killer 
Hannibal “The Cannibal” Lecter (played by Anthony Hopkins), and the FBI’s attempts to bring him to 
justice. In one central scene, Lecter has the US Justice Department official Paul Krendler (Ray Liotta) 
captive in his own (Krendler’s) house. Lecter, a world-class psychiatrist, has sedated Krendler and removed 
the cap of his skull, which is now open with the upper part of his brain in plain sight of the audience. In 
almost ceremonial fashion, Lecter proceeds to feed Krendler tidbits from his own brain, after Lecter has 
freshly plucked and then stir-fried them. All the props and special effects employed to make this scene are 
designed to make it disgusting to watch, and to represent realistically a common disgust elicitor, viz. a 
living human brain in an open skull. 
A similar case from the same film involves the elaborate make-up created for the actor Gary 
Oldman, most unrecognizable as Mason Verger, Hannibal Lecter’s wealthy and vindictive former patient. 
As a young man, Verger disfigured his own face under Lecter’s psychological influence. Multiple Oscar-
                                                     
3 For another categorization, see Filippo Contesi, The Disgusting in Art (PhD thesis, University of York, 2014), 
Chapter 4. 
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winning make-up artist Greg Cannom created Oldman’s make-up with the help of medical doctors to 
ensure a high degree of realism. 
Another large class of cases is provided by those contemporary artists Arthur Danto referred to as 
“the intractable avant-garde”.4 One case in point are (Oxford-educated South African artist) Lennie Lee’s 
photographs and performances involving disgusting props (and often featuring the artist himself). 
What the previous cases do with disgusting make-up and special effects, literature does with words. 
Consider for instance the first description of Dr Frankenstein’s newly-created monster, from Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818): 
His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous 
black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid 
contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun-white sockets in 
which they were set, his shrivelled complexion and straight black lips.5 
Once again, here the subject matter’s disgustingness is conveyed realistically by means of a disgusting 
vehicle. 
However, these are cases in which the disgustingness of the vehicle is achieved by using materials 
that, arguably, are only fictionally disgusting and/or represent disgustingness. Verger’s face is disgusting in 
the film because physical deformities of that kind are commonly disgusting. By contrast, the make-up Gary 
Oldman used so that his face would appear deformed is itself not necessarily disgusting for it is not real skin 
or part of an actual, deformed face. Or, to take the Frankenstein case, Shelley’s words are not themselves 
made of a disgusting substance; they only represent disgusting substances. All this is important to note 
insofar as, at least according to some, disgust is best understood ideationally, rather than sensorily.6 In other 
                                                     
4 Arthur Danto, The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the concept of art (Open Court, 2003), Chapter 2. 
5 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (eBooks@Adelaide, 1831/2014), Chapter 5: 
https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/s/shelley/mary/s53f/index.html. 
6 Filippo Contesi, “Korsmeyer on Fiction and Disgust,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 55, 109–16, 2015. 
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words, mere sensory properties or resemblance in appearance are not necessarily disgusting if they are not 
cognitively interpreted as belonging to something disgusting. 
Some artworks, however, use non-fictional props as disgusting vehicles to represent disgusting 
subjects. A treasure trove of such works is contemporary artist Andres Serrano’s Shit (2007). This is a series 
of sixty-six photographic close-ups of (actual) human, dog, jaguar and bull feces. 
However, whether a work is fictional cannot always be easily determined. Such is sometimes the 
case in painting. It is not obvious whether for instance Rembrandt’s Carcass of Beef (1657) depicts a real or a 
non-fictional carcass of beef. Another case is The Wounded Man (1919), one of the most powerful of Gert 
Wollheim’s works, and certainly his best-known. Wollheim’s painting dates from the immediate aftermath 
of the Great War and quite explicitly deals with the horrors of that war. Saliently, it portrays a man whose 
arms and legs are stretched in a pose of intense suffering. The man has a large and bloody wound on his 
stomach (Wollheim himself was shot in the stomach during the War, with near-fatal consequences) and 
blood on the palms of his hands. One cannot clearly determine whether the depicted wounded man is a 
fictional figure or an actual man, and perhaps it is Wollheim himself. Nonetheless, Wollheim’s masterpiece 
is a memorable symbolic representation of the suffering that the Great War caused to tens of millions of 
women and men in Europe and elsewhere. It represents a disgusting subject, both bodily and morally, and 
does so by means of the disgusting depiction of blood flowing from a man’s large stomach wound. 
But fictionality is not the only layer of distance that art can interpose between its materials and 
subjects and its audience. Orthogonal to the fiction/non-fiction dichotomy, Derek Matravers has recently 
made the case for the usefulness of a dichotomy between confrontations and representations.7 On this latter 
dichotomy, cases of representation are cases in which it is impossible to act on the represented object or 
                                                     
7 Derek Matravers, Fiction and Narrative (Oxford University Press, 2014). For a critical take on Matravers’ 
argument, see Noël Carroll, “A Critical Review of Derek Matravers’s Fiction and Narrative,” Philosophy and 
Literature 40, 569–78, 2016. 
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event. But the represented subject can be both fictional and non-fictional. For example, both a non-fictional 
recounting of the battle of Waterloo and Steven Spielberg’s E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial (1982) are 
representation cases. Such cases are contrasted by Matravers to cases in which one is confronted with, or in 
other words can act on, an object or an event. 
All the vehicles of the works discussed in this first category so far are on the representation side of 
Matravers’ dichotomy. Whether fictional (Hannibal and Frankenstein), non-fictional (Serrano) or less 
straightforward cases (Carcass of Beef and The Wounded Man), confrontation is impossible in all of them. By 
contrast, works of performance art such as those produced, from the 1960’s onwards, in Hermann Nitsch’s 
Orgien Mysterien Theater confront their audiences (or, perhaps better, participants) with non-fictional 
disgusting materials. In Nitsch’s Orgien, actual animals are slaughtered and their carcasses paraded around, 
and touched and smelled, without any representational mediation. 
However, there are some works that should be considered as candidate members of this first 
category that do not straightforwardly fall on either side of the confrontation/representation dichotomy. 
Some of these are cases in which something disgusting is presented to an audience that is also, in a sense, 
hidden to them. This is arguably the case of a work of performance art such as Vito Acconci’s Seedbed 
(1971). In this work, visitors to the Sonnabend Gallery in New York were presented with the voice coming 
out of loud speakers of (what reportedly was) the artist, hidden under the gallery floor masturbating whilst 
he described his sexual fantasies out loud. It can be argued that in this case audiences cannot act on the 
situation being presented to them. They are thus not confronted (in Matravers’ sense) with the artist 
masturbating. Instead, they are better described as being in the presence of the artist masturbating.8 9 
                                                     
8 See Filippo Contesi, “Disgust’s Transparency,” British Journal of Aesthetics 56: 347–54, 2016, 349–50n for some 
reasons to prefer a presence/representation distinction to Matravers’ confrontation/representation dichotomy. 
9 A similar case in this respect is Damien Hirst’s A Thousand Years (1990), which we discuss later as a member of 
our second category. 
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Another kind of case that provides good candidate members for this first category of works is Andy 
Warhol’s series of “oxidation paintings”. Executed mainly between the end of the 1970s and the beginning 
of the 1980s, these paintings exhibit a characteristic visual style. This style is the consequence of various 
execution techniques, somewhat different one from the other, but all having in common urine staining and 
a subsequent process of oxidation or other similar chemical alteration. Basically, the paintings would go 
through a stage of being urinated on, often by one of Warhol’s friends or acquaintances. A widely known 
item in this series is Basquiat (1982). 
A similar, earlier example is Marcel Duchamp’s Paysage Fautif (1946), featuring a colored splash, on 
black satin, of what is reportedly the artist’s own semen. In this case, one could argue that the subject is not 
completely intended as disgusting. Given the general nature of Duchamp’s oeuvre, Paysage Fautif certainly, 
at least partly, meant to shock its audience. However, the work was also reportedly a statement of sorts of 
Duchamp’s sexual lust for Maria Martins, a fellow artist of his.10 So Duchamp presumably saw the subject 
matter of the work to be also sexual attraction. 
Whilst in Warhol’s and Duchamp’s cases the disgusting is present to the audience, a similar kind of 
case that involves representations is offered by Gilbert & George’s series of microscopic photographs of 
bodily substances: such as Piss on Piss (1996), Piss on Blood (1996) or Spunk on Sweat (1997). These are images 
of bodily fluids as they really look under the microscope (although subsequently hand-dyed by the artists). It 
is worth emphasizing, however, that the vehicle in the Gilbert & George examples is disgusting only insofar 
as the microscopic pictures are (known to be) representations of commonly disgusting substances. Also 
worth noting is that, although the intended subject of these works is, at least partly, the disgusting 
substances their titles make explicit reference to, something decidedly non-disgusting may also be part of 
that subject. If the artists’ own words are to be taken as a guide (even though it is unclear how much 
                                                     
10 Saher Sohail, “Faulty Landscape,” Sartle, available at: https://www.sartle.com/artwork/faulty-landscape-marcel-
duchamp. 
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tongue-in-cheek they are in this case), the works in question are meant to manifest unexpected majesty and 
beauty. As they say: 
Out of these drops of blood come stained-glass windows from fourteenth-century cathedrals, or 
Islamic writing [...] To see daggers and medieval swords in sweat: that’s our aim. In piss you find 
pistols, flowers, crucifixes. Spunk amazes us… it really does look like a crown of thorns.11 
 
3. Neutral Subjects and Disgusting Vehicles 
 
 Perhaps the best-known examples of the category of disgust involving the marriage of a disgusting 
vehicle with non-disgusting content is the genre of the vanitas still-life in which assorted objects are 
juxtaposed with such symbols of death as a human skull, sometimes yellowed – not the sort of thing one is 
tempted to touch, fondle, or lick. For example, consider Pieter Claesz’s 1630 Vanitas. A jawless skull, 
flanked by a bone from some limb, is propped up on a set of moldering books. Adjacent, there is an empty 
candle holder and a watch.  Together these items – but especially the human remains – are meant to 
conjure the notion of time and, hence, mortality, reminding viewers that the pursuits of life, such as the 
knowledge represented by the books, are vain given our inevitable destiny. 
 These pictures were intended to remind us of death (memento mori) and to dissuade overinvestment 
in our temporal existence. Mortality is the content of these artworks; that is what they are about. But 
although mortality, as an abstract concept, is not disgusting, its conjunction with or figuration by means of 
repulsive imagery (in the Claesz case, for instance, the yellowed, jawless skull with a broken nose and 
several missing teeth) is. 
                                                     
11 Tate Modern, “Room 13,” Gilbert & George; Room guide, available at: http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-
modern/exhibition/gilbert-george/gilbert-george-major-exhibition-room-guide/gilbert-11. 
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The Prince of this World, a fourteenth century sculpture in St Sebald’s Cathedral in Nurnberg shows a 
comely figure in a cloak frontally. But as you move around the statue, his garment opens to reveal a swath 
of corruption. His back is pocked, flayed, and scarred, with worms festering, symbolizing inexorable decay. 
 The memento mori is still a contemporary theme. Damien Hirst’s Grand High Priest of the Abject #3 is 
an installation piece that involves a slab of meat enclosed in a plastic housing populated by swarming flies 
that collide with an insect-zapper, dropping to and littering the floor.  It is an image capable of eliciting a 
gag-response. But, again, its higher purpose is to remind us of where the cycle of life and its omni-phagus 
pursuits end, namely in a pile of rotting tissue. 
 Mortality is not the only general or abstract subject that art figures by means of disgust. The 
incarnation of Jesus is frequently signaled through the revolting treatment of his body as in Mathias 
Grünewald’s portrayal of his crucifixion in his Isenheim Altarpiece or as in the lacerating flogging to which 
he is subjected in Mel Gibson’s film The Passion of the Christ. By emphasizing the repelling violence done to 
Christ’s body, his carnality as well as the magnitude of his sacrifice are symbolized physically. 
 Of course, the representation of things that are not disgusting by disgusting images is not always 
done for the sake of symbolism. Medical photos and biology movies may represent physical processes via 
imagery that the uninitiated may find disgusting to look at, such as birth – an event that is rumored to have 
caused many fathers to faint. Moreover, such imagery can be incorporated into artworks, such as Stan 
Brakhage’s 1959 experimental film Window Water Baby Moving, a celebration of the birth of his first child, 
Myrrena. 
 Although the conjunction of a viscerally disgusting vehicle in artworks with non-viscerally 
disgusting content need not be engaged for symbolic purposes, it is striking how often the rhetoric of 
disgust is mobilized to figuratively characterize the content of the artwork, often for moral or political 
purposes. George Grosz’s caricatures portray the plutocrats of Weimar Germany and the prostitutes who 
service them as loathsome grotesques, overweight, slobbering, and gluttonous. In Sunny Land (1920), Grosz 
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makes his view of the upper class as porcine literal by giving the wealthy burgher sitting at the dinner table 
the head of a pig. But even in images such as his Beauty, Thee Will I Praise (1919), the nauseating brutishness 
of the bourgeoisie is unmistakable.   
 As is well known, although disgust originates as a physical response to unwholesome foods, like 
sour milk, and sources of infection, such as leprosy, it can be mobilized by culture to stigmatize by 
association everything from untainted foods, like lobster, to behaviors, such as amorous behaviors, like anal 
sex. Disgust, that is, can be transferred from the realm of biology to that of mores.  Just as we can find 
rotten meat disgusting, so it is said we can find individuals and even groups of people morally disgusting. 
What Grosz is doing in many of his caricatures is trying to convey the thought that the plutocrats that he 
portrays as physically disgusting are, in fact, morally disgusting. That is, a physically disgusting vehicle is 
used to get across the idea that the subject – the wealth-holding, propertied classes – are morally disgusting. 
 Disgust, in other words, can provide a vocabulary – visual and/or linguistic – of ethical contempt. 
An essentially non-physically disgusting person or category – such as a politician or a political movement – 
can be characterized figuratively by way of being represented via a viscerally disgusting vehicle. 
 Obviously, this is not only a modern phenomenon. For centuries, Satan and his minions were 
portrayed as composite beings – part goat, part human. When Bosch wanted to castigate priests as morally 
disreputable, he gave them the visage of rats. In cases like these, categorical contradictions resulting in 
impure hybrids made moral evil manifest. Just as the beautiful images of Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and various 
saints are meant to symbolize their moral goodness, disgust, the putative antithesis of beauty, can function 
as an outward side of moral loathsomeness.12 Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray might be thought of as 
a fictional articulation of and comment upon this structural premise. 
                                                     
12 See Noël Carroll, “Ethnicity, Race, and Monstrosity: The Rhetorics of Horror and Humor,” in Beauty Matters, 
edited by Peg Brand (Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 37–56. 
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 In modern art, disgust is often recruited to express moral indignation. In his film Salò, Pasolini, in 
part, depicted the moral degradation of the fascists’ behavior by having them force children to eat feces, 
compelling viewers like me, at least, to actually choke at the sight – thereby, making moral disgust, so to 
speak, palpable.   
Earlier, in his film The Damned, Visconti attempted to telegraph the moral depravity of the Nazis by 
portraying the Brown Shirts in general and Martin von Essenbeck in particular as homosexual where, in the 
historical context of the making of the film, homosexuality was (wrongly) thought to be a perversion and, 
therefore, disgusting. Although this device is no longer serviceable, given our present understanding of 
homosexuality, the rhetorical mechanism that Visconti was relying upon is still recognizable. To 
communicate moral disgust artistically embody the subject of the intended reaction in a putatively 
disgusting vehicle. 
 As has already been seen, this conjunction of content that is not literally, physically disgusting with 
a vehicle that is literally, physically disgusting provides a very serviceable strategy for socially critical art. 
Paul McCarthy’s multi-media-installation extravaganza WS is, in large measure, a demented, debauched, 
obscene and disordered Disneyland – or better, “Disneyworld” – which, juxtaposed to images of 
McCarthy’s childhood home in Utah, is meant to stand for America.   
The title are the initials of Snow White inverted just as the scenography of WS is an inversion of 
Disneyworld. Snow White, the Seven Dwarves, and Walt Disney engage in every sort of sexual perversion, 
addiction, and orgiastic revel, including bouts of sadistic mayhem, buggery, even unto murder. Characters 
defecate, masturbate, copulate, vomit, draw blood, and so on frequently and fulsomely. Whereas Walt 
Disney’s Magic Kingdom is spotless, McCarthy’s is a miasma of slop.  Where Disney’s world is nice; 
McCarthy’s is nasty – a veritable Black Mass of the values enshrined in the Disney universe.   
Moreover, insofar as Disneyworld is an avatar for American culture writ large, the visceral disgust 
WS is stylistically predicated upon eliciting expresses the moral disgust McCarthy feels towards the United 
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States, unmasking its “Disney-fied” facade figuratively in order to reveal and denounce its underlying and 
repressed violence, lust, mean-spiritedness, and perversion. 
 The structure of this artwork, like that of many of the previous examples in this section, involves 
deploying the vehicle or form of embodiment of the piece as, in effect, a figurative comment upon the 
content of the work – that is what the work is about. The content of the work – say Disney-America – is 
not viscerally disgusting on its own terms. Rather it is characterized as morally disgusting by being 
represented by means of viscerally disgusting imagery. A suggestive analogy of the way in which it operates 
is to imagine the content as providing the subject as if it were a noun which the vehicle or form of 
embodiment like an adjective then goes on to modify as disgusting, and often, specifically, morally 
disgusting.   
 In the Introduction to this essay, it was claimed that drawing our taxonomy of disgust in terms of 
content and vehicle might bring to light certain interesting phenomena. Elucidating this structure for the 
articulation of moral disgust is the sort of thing that we had in mind.  
        
4. Disgusting Subjects and Neutral Vehicles 
 
We now come to our third and final category: works that use a neutral vehicle to treat a disgusting 
subject. One kind of candidate members for this category is constituted by non-realistic representations of 
what is ordinarily disgusting. Pablo Picasso’s Guernica (1937), for instance, portrays the bloody massacre of 
the population of the Basque town of Guernica, bombed by German and Italian war planes during the 
Spanish Civil War. The painting represents beheadings and dismemberments of men and animals. The 
subject represented is no doubt disgusting, both bodily as well as morally (the painting aims to denounce 
the atrocities of the Spanish Civil War). But the representations themselves are not, in large part because 
they lack sufficient realism. 
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A similar treatment, by non-disgusting means, of the subject of war and its bodily and morally 
disgusting aspects is provided by George Grosz’s black-and-white lithograph Quitting Time (1919). Like 
Guernica, Quitting Time also denounces the horrors of war but is not disgusting. The disfigured face of the 
soldier lying on the floor should be a pretty disgusting sight if there is one, but it is not in Grosz’s depiction. 
Here again, lack of realism, both in the coloring and in the disegno of the piece, is a crucial factor. 
Music offers instances of art that aims to treat disgusting subjects by means of non-disgusting 
vehicles. Often, this is the case where the subject at hand is morally disgusting. One such instance is Gustav 
Mahler’s so-called “cry of disgust” passage from the third movement of his Symphony No 2 (1895). The 
passage is a piece of pure instrumental music and, arguably, no part of it is disgusting. However, a 
connection is often made between the response appropriate to the passage and moral disgust. Martha 
Nussbaum reports Mahler’s own words: 
the idea [behind the passage] is that of looking at “the bustle of existence,” the shallowness and 
herdlike selfishness of society, until it “becomes horrible to you, like the swaying of dancing figures 
in a brightly-lit ballroom, into which you look from the dark night outside....Life strikes you as 
meaningless, a frightful ghost, from which you perhaps start away with a cry of disgust.13 
Finally, two ambiguous, complex cases are provided in turn by conceptual and installation art. The 
first of these cases is Piero Manzoni’s Merda d’artista (1961), a series of 90 tin cans labelled in four languages 
and numbered. The content of the cans is, according to the labels affixed on the cans by the artist: “Artist’s 
Shit/ 30 gr net/ freshly preserved/ produced and tinned/ in May 1961”. Manzoni’s work is arguably meant 
to call its audience’s attention to the quasi-holy status of the artist in the post-Duchamp art-world. A sort of 
King Midas or a Jesus-as-Healer, whatever the artist gets in touch with, becomes art. His own faeces are no 
                                                     
13 Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, shame, and the law (Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 
104, quoting from Mahler’s “Letter to Max Marschalk”, as reported in Deryck Cooke, Gustav Mahler: An 
introduction to his music (Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
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exception. Indeed, Manzoni sold some of the cans by weight (30 grams each) at the then-going market price 
of gold. Since then, the cans’ worth has actually far surpassed the equivalent price of gold for their named 
weight. 
While the subject matter of Manzoni’s work is, at least in part, his feces, a less straightforward 
issue is whether or not the work’s vehicle is also disgusting. Many have expressed skepticism concerning the 
actual content of the cans. For instance, Agostino Bonalumi, a collaborator of Manzoni’s, famously stated in 
2007 that Manzoni’s cans contained just plaster. A French artist, Bernard Bazile, staked his claim to 
notoriety by opening up one of Manzoni’s cans and turning it into a work of art of its own: Boîte ouverte de 
Piero Manzoni (1989). Bazile however did not solve the mystery as he only revealed an unidentified wrapped 
object inside the can.14 
However, even if the mystery of the actual content of Manzoni’s cans was one day resolved, the 
issue of the disgustingness of the vehicle of Merda d’artista may still remain ambiguous. If the cans turn out to 
contain actual feces, then the issue may be considered settled. If, however, the actual content of Manzoni’s 
cans is found out to be non-disgusting (if it is, say, plaster), one may still argue that the verbal reference to 
feces (in the title and on the labels) is already sufficient to make the work’s vehicle disgusting. 
The second ambiguous case is Thomas Hirschhorn’s more recent installation Touching Reality 
(2012). In this installation, audiences are in a cinema-type space where a video is shown of gruesome 
(ostensibly non-fictional) photographs of what the artist calls “destroyed human bodies”. In the video, (what 
appears to be) a feminine, well-manicured hand flicks through these pictures like one does on a touch-
screen: pinching to zoom in or out and moving around to show different bits of the pictures, sometimes in 
excruciating detail. On the one hand, the subject of the work is once more the bodily and moral 
disgustingness of violence and war. Its vehicle, on the other hand, is disgusting if one identifies it as 
                                                     
14 See John Miller, “Excremental value”, Tate Etc. 10, 2007, available at: http://www.tate.org.uk/context-
comment/articles/excremental-value. 
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consisting of the content of the gruesome pictures shown. Hirschhorn’s work however differs from the 
typical video in that it has an additional layer, which is provided by the reference to touch in the title of the 
work and by the role of the hand flicking through the images. On this layer, the vehicle of the work is not 
constituted by the destroyed bodies represented, but by something (at least on one construal) non-
disgusting: a touch-screen.15 
                                                     
15 We are grateful to the following for comments on earlier versions of this paper: Raciel Cuevas, Peter Lamarque, 
and audiences at the Universities of Milan and York. Contesi acknowledges the generous support of the US–Italy 
Fulbright Research Scholars Programme, the Temple University Department of Philosophy and the LOGOS 
Research Group (University of Barcelona). 
